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ARTICLE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS PLACED ON 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF AN ACCOMPLICE-TURNED-
GOVERNMENT-WITNESS 
M. Jackson Jones Esq., M.S.† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Alfred Pennyworth: I suppose they’ll lock me up as well. As your 
accomplice . . . .  
Bruce Wayne: Accomplice? I’m going to tell them the whole 
thing was your idea.1 
 
The federal courts of appeals are currently split over whether the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause2 is violated when a defendant is not 
allowed to cross-examine an accomplice-turned-government-witness about 
the specific penalty reduction the accomplice believed he or she would 
receive for testifying for the government and against the defendant.3 This 
split that began in the 1980s has existed for nearly thirty years. Courts of 
appeals have fallen on one side or the other of the question of whether 
prohibiting inquiry into an accomplice’s subjective beliefs violates the 
Confrontation Clause.4 This Article argues that prohibiting such inquiry 
violates the Confrontation Clause. 
Part II of this Article examines the early history of the Confrontation 
Clause, particularly cases and events that led to the adoption of the clause. 
Part III discusses some opinions from federal courts of appeals that have 
                                                                                                                           
 † M. Jackson Jones is an Assistant District Attorney for the Bristol County, 
Massachusetts District Attorney’s Office. He also teaches criminal law at the University of 
Massachusetts-Dartmouth. I give thanks to my loyal confidants: Kelly Costa, Derek Coyne, 
John Flor, Jennifer Gonzalez, Carolyn Morrissette, and Carla Sauvignon, who have always 
expressed an interest in all my scholarly endeavors. I also wish to give thanks to Sir Walter 
Raleigh; his criminal trial, which was one of the most famous trials of his time, provided the 
foundation for my passion in this area of Sixth Amendment law. 
 1. THE DARK KNIGHT (Warner Bros. Pictures 2008). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 3. See United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 4. See United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142 (1st Cir. 1995). But see 
Chandler, 326 F.3d at 210; United States v. Turner, 198 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 1999). The 
remaining federal courts of appeals are either undecided on the issue or have not addressed 
it. 
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addressed this issue. Part IV analyzes relevant Supreme Court precedent, 
the admissibility of accomplice statements, and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
  In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense.5 
The Bill of Rights conferred a host of additional constitutional 
protections in 1791, but many of these rights, including those relating to 
criminal prosecutions under the Sixth Amendment, have historical roots 
reaching back throughout history. “The inspiration for the Confrontation 
Clause likely derived from the English system, but the concept of ‘facing 
the accusers against you’ can be seen in the works of William Shakespeare 
and the Bible.”6 For example, Shakespeare wrote in Richard II, “[t]hen call 
them to our presence—face to face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves 
will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak . . . .”7  
Similarly, in Acts 25, the Apostle Paul was charged with several crimes.8 
Though Paul’s accusers wanted him sentenced to death,9 Festus, the Roman 
governor of Judea, refused to sentence the Apostle without allowing him to 
face his accusers.10 Festus declared, “[i]t is not the manner of the Romans to 
deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face to 
face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against the charges.”11  
                                                                                                                           
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added to highlight the Confrontation Clause). 
 6. Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: The Current 
State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 763, 765 
(2000). 
 7. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
RICHARD II act 1, sc. 1). 
 8. Acts 25:7 (NIV). 
 9. Acts 25:1-3 (NIV). 
 10. Acts 25:1-6 (NIV).  
 11. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015-16 (citing Acts 25:16). 
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The Roman Emperor Trajan faced the same confrontation issues during 
the Empire’s prosecution of Christians.12 He ruled, “anonymous accusations 
must not be admitted in evidence as against anyone, as it is introducing a 
dangerous precedent, and out of accord with the spirit of our times.”13 
Confrontation issues continued to proliferate throughout the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. For example, English court officials, such as 
justices of the peace, examined witnesses prior to trial.14 “These 
examinations were sometimes read in court in lieu of live testimony, a 
practice that ‘occasioned frequent demands by the prisoner to have his 
‘accusers,’ i.e. the witnesses against him, brought before him face to 
face.’”15 
Parties raised such demands in a number of British cases. In 1554, Sir 
Nicholas Throckmorton stood trial for treason.16 The court would not allow 
Throckmorton to have an attorney, call witnesses, or present any defense.17 
During his trial that lasted one day, Throckmorton objected to the 
prosecution’s use of a missing witness’s deposition.18 He stated, “how 
happeneth it he is not brought face to face to justify this matter . . . .”19 
Throckmorton’s objection was unsuccessful, and he was convicted. 
Nearly fifty years after Throckmorton’s case, the confrontation issue was 
raised again during the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. His trial was perhaps the 
most famous confrontation case in British history. 
In 1603, Raleigh stood trial for treason.20 During his trial, the 
prosecution read letters from Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord 
Cobham,21 as well as Cobham’s examination before the Privy Council.22 In 
both the examination and the letter, Cobham implicated Raleigh.23 Raleigh 
                                                                                                                           
 12. Daniel H. Pollit, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. 
PUB. L. 381, 384 (1959). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2003). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Robert J. McWhirter, How the Sixth Amendment Guarantees You the Right to a 
Lawyer, A Fair Trial, and a Chamber Pot, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Dec. 2007, at 17 n.3. 
 17. Id. 
 18. David Lusty, Anonymous Accusers: An Historical & Comparative Analysis of Secret 
Witnesses in Criminal Trials, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 361, 371 (2002). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
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adamantly protested the introduction of these two items, arguing that a 
desire to obtain the King’s favor motivated Cobham’s accusations.24 
Raleigh stated, “Cobham is absolutely in the King’s mercy; to excuse me 
cannot avail him; by accusing me he may hope for favour.”25 Raleigh also 
demanded Cobham be brought to court to testify personally against him.26 
He said, “[t]he Proof of the Common Law is by witness and jury: let 
Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face . . . .”27 
The trial judge did not grant Raleigh’s demands and instead sentenced 
Raleigh to death.28 
In the wake of Sir Walter Raleigh’s unjust trial, Parliament made face-to-
face confrontation mandatory for the prosecution of certain crimes.29 “For 
example, treason statutes required witnesses to confront the accused ‘face 
to face’ at his arraignment.”30 Parliament also changed the rules for 
admitting evidence from witnesses who were unavailable to testify.31 For 
example, in the 1696 case of King v. Paine, the court held that a deceased 
witness’s testimony could not be used against a defendant when the 
defendant did not receive an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.32 
A. The Colonial Roots of the Confrontation Clause 
The American colonies also faced their own confrontation issues.33 The 
Virginia Council “protested against the Governor for having ‘privately 
issued several commissions to examine witnesses against particular men ex 
parte,’ complaining that ‘the person accused is not admitted to be 
confronted with, or defend himself against his defamers.’”34 The colonists 
sought to remedy such governmental behavior by including constitutional 
provisions granting defendants the right to confront their accusers.  
                                                                                                                           
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. One of Raleigh’s judges even said, “[t]he justice of England has never been so 
degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh.” Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 46. 
 34. Id. at 47. 
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For example, Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
states, “every subject shall have a right . . . to meet the witnesses against 
him face to face . . . .”35 This same notion appears in Article I, Section XV 
of the New Hampshire State Constitution and Section IX of the 
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights.36 
Other state constitutions granted defendants the right to confront their 
accusers without using face to face terminology. For example, the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights provides “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every 
man hath a right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”37 The 
North Carolina State Constitution and the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
have similar provisions.38  
Interestingly, the proposed federal Constitution almost did not contain 
the Confrontation Clause.39 However, it became a part of the Constitution 
after legislators advocated for its adoption.40 
B.  The International Response 
Other nations adopted constitutional provisions that are very similar to 
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The Philippine Bill of 
Rights, for example, has been interpreted as “secur[ing] the accused the 
right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by 
only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their 
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-
examination.”41 The Japanese Constitution also has a provision that states 
“[the accused] ‘shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses 
. . . .’”42 
                                                                                                                           
 35. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII. 
 36. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XV (“Every subject shall have a right . . . to meet the 
witnesses against him face to face . . . .”); see also PA. CONST. art. I, § IX (“That in all 
prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses [against him] . . . .”). 
 37. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. XXI. 
 38. See VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 8 (1776) (“[A] man hath a right to . . . be 
confronted with the accusers and witnesses . . . .”); see also N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“[I]n all 
criminal prosecutions, every man has a right to be informed of the accusation against him, 
and to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony . . .”). 
 39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48. 
 40. Id. at 48-49. 
 41. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988). 
 42. NIHONKOKU KENPƿ [KENPƿ ] [CONSTITUTION] art. 37, para. 1 (Japan). 
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Federal courts vary in their application of the Confrontation Clause, and 
several circuits are split on an issue concerning the subjective intent of the 
witness. The confusion arises when determining whether the accused has a 
Sixth Amendment right to interrogate a witness concerning the subjective 
reasons behind a witness’s acceptance of a plea agreement and the 
subsequent impact on the witness’s willingness to testify. 
A.  The First Circuit Court of Appeals’ View in United States v. Luciano-
Mosquera: No Confrontation Clause Violation if a Defense Attorney 
Cannot Inquire Into an Accomplice’s Subjective Understanding of His 
or Her Plea Agreement With the Government 
 
Carlos Pan-San-Miguel (“Miguel”), Edgar Gonzalez-Valentin, Raul 
Lugo-Maya, Rafael Pava-Buelba, and Julio Luciano-Mosquera were found 
guilty of various drug offenses.43 During Miguel’s trial, one of his co-
accomplices, Jonas Castillo-Ramos (“Ramos”), testified against him and for 
the government.44 In return for Ramos’s testimony, the government did not 
pursue firearm charges against him.45 
Miguel’s attorney attempted to cross-examine Ramos about the penalties 
Ramos would have faced if the government pursued the firearm charges.46 
Specifically, the defense attorney attempted to ask Ramos “whether 
[Ramos’s] attorney had informed him that if he had been ‘found guilty of 
the possession of the firearm during the commission of a drug offense [he 
would be] sentenced to thirty-five years in addition to the drug offense.’”47 
The judge did not allow this question.48 
                                                                                                                           
 43. United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1148 (1st Cir. 1995). The five 
defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to import cocaine, importing 232.8 kilograms of 
cocaine, possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and knowingly carrying or aiding and 
abetting the carrying of firearms in relation to the drug trafficking. See id. 
 44. Id. at 1153. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (noting that the trial judge ruled that informing the jurors about the possible 
penalties Ramos faced was an attempt to inform jurors about the penalties Miguel faced for 
violating the same firearm statute). 
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On appeal, Miguel argued that the judge’s ruling violated his Sixth 
Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause.49 The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals agreed with the trial judge’s ruling.50 It noted that the trial 
court has discretion to limit cross-examination that may be prejudicial, 
repetitive, or irrelevant.51 Additionally, the court stated that a trial judge 
does not exceed this discretion as long as the jury had enough evidence to 
“make a discriminating appraisal of the possible biases and motivations of 
the witnesses.”52 
In this case, the court believed the jury had sufficient information to 
make a discriminating appraisal of Ramos’s biases. It recognized that 
Miguel’s attorney was allowed to repeatedly ask Ramos about any benefits 
the government provided him for testifying.53 The court believed that 
informing the jury of the number of years Ramos avoided was of very 
minimal value. It wrote, “[t]he district court properly decided that the value 
of the information was outweighed by the potential for prejudice by having 
the jury learn what penalties the defendants were facing.”54 
B. Alternative Views: Confrontation Clause Violation If A Defense 
Attorney Cannot Inquire Into An Accomplice’s Subjective 
Understanding Of His Or Her Plea Agreement With The Government 
 Other circuits have rejected the First Circuit’s view that there is 
minimal value in allowing the jury to hear the benefits bestowed on the 
witness for his or her testimony. These courts consider preventing a jury 
from hearing the consequences that will be imposed on the witness for not 
testifying as problematic. This information, they contend, is necessary for 
the jury to understand any bias or prejudice, and to determine what weight 
such testimony should be given.   
1. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals: United States v. Turner 
(1999) 
Eric Michael Turner was convicted of “engaging in a continuing criminal 
enterprise; intentionally killing an individual while engaging in a 
continuing criminal enterprise; interstate travel in aid of a racketeering 
                                                                                                                           
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (quoting Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
 54. Id. at 1153. 
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enterprise; and using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence.”55 
On appeal, Turner argued that the trial court inappropriately limited his 
cross-examination of an accomplice-turned-government-witness, Denise 
Grantham.56 
During his trial, Turner’s defense attorney attempted to cross-examine 
Grantham about the penalties she faced for participating in the murder. The 
following exchange took place: 
[Turner’s attorney]: So your choices were to talk with the police 
or be indicted for continuing criminal enterprise and for murder; 
is that right? 
[Grantham]: Yes. 
[Turner’s attorney]: Did you have some idea what the penalties 
might be at that time? 
[Grantham]: My understanding was . . . . 57 
The prosecution objected, asserting that the penalties were not relevant. 
The judge refused to allow Grantham to answer the question because the 
judge believed her answer would inform jurors of the penalties Turner 
faced. 58 Instead, Grantham was only permitted to state that the penalties she 
faced were “pretty serious.”59 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the trial judge’s ruling, holding that an 
accomplice-turned-government-witness could be cross-examined about the 
accomplice’s subjective understanding of the penalties he would face if the 
accomplice did not testify for the prosecution.60 The court believed that this 
information helped defense attorneys establish an accomplice’s bias, 
prejudice, and motive for testifying against his co-accomplice.61 The court 
therefore ruled that such information was relevant in helping the jury assess 
the accomplice-turned-government-witness’s credibility.62  
In addition, the Fourth Circuit was not concerned with the jury learning 
about the penalties Turner faced. It instead held that the “impeachment 
value of Grantham’s testimony” outweighed any of these concerns.63 
                                                                                                                           
 55. United States v. Turner, 198 F.3d 425, 427 (4th Cir. 1999).  
 56. Id. at 429. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 430. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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2. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals: United States v. Chandler 
(2003) 
Linda Lee Chandler was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 
121 months imprisonment.64 During Chandler’s trial, two accomplices, Sly 
Sylvester and Kathleen Yearwood, testified against her for the 
prosecution.65 Chandler’s attorney “attempted to cross-examine Sylvester 
about the sentence reduction he had received, and to cross-examine 
Kathleen Yearwood about the reduction she hoped to receive, in exchange 
for their guilty pleas and cooperation.”66 The trial judge limited Chandler’s 
attorney’s inquiry to the accomplices’ subjective beliefs. 
(a) Sylvester’s Testimony 
Sylvester admitted that he was testifying pursuant to a plea agreement.67 
Since Sylvester testified against Chandler, the government “limited the 
charges against him to those associated with the three-ounce cocaine sale . . 
.” even though Sylvester admitted to selling nearly five kilograms of 
cocaine.68 Instead of being imprisoned for twelve to eighteen months, as 
recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, Sylvester’s cooperation 
resulted in a sentence of one month of house arrest and probation.69 
 
The following is an excerpt from the cross-examination of Sylvester: 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: Did anyone explain to you what the 
penalties for five kilos is under the guidelines? 
[United States Attorney]: Your Honor, I object to these questions 
regarding the penalties for five kilos. 
[The Court]: Okay. Penalties should not be discussed in the case, 
I would agree. 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: All right. 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: Did they ever—well, was it explained to 
you that it was much more serious, that the Government actually 
gave you a break by charging you this small amount? 
                                                                                                                           
 64. United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 213 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 216. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 216-17 (noting that during his testimony, Sylvester acknowledged that he 
could have been charged with trafficking cocaine). 
 69. Id. at 217. 
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[Sylvester]: That’s a great question because they only had me on 
three ounces. That’s what they said the terms of this would be 12 
to 18. I am not so sure exactly of your question. Would you want 
me to say to you that the bigger you sell, the more you sell, the 
more penalty? Well, of course. 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: Okay. At the time you sold that three 
ounces, you had been dealing for awhile, hadn’t you? 
[Sylvester]: Yes, sir.70 
(b) Yearwood’s Testimony 
Prior to testifying, Yearwood pled guilty to trafficking between fifteen to 
fifty kilograms of cocaine, but she had not been sentenced.71 She testified in 
hopes “that the government would move for a reduced sentence against 
her.”72 
 
Yearwood’s cross-examination was similar to Sylvester’s: 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: . . . You want to talk about Linda 
Chandler, is that correct? 
[Yearwood]: Right. 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: Because you have an agreement, isn’t 
that correct, and [the assistant United States Attorney] is going 
to, you hope, put in a motion to cut your time? 
[Yearwood]: Yes. 
. . . 
 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: Now you want to help yourself and 
help—because you are in serious trouble. You were dealing in 
multikilos. Yes or no? 
[Yearwood]: I’m 50. No more than 50. 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: No more than 50 in this. But do you think 
you dealt more than 50? 
[Yearwood]: No, I don’t think so. 
. . . 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: How many lie detector tests did the 
Government put you on? 
[Yearwood]: None, but they can put me on them. 
                                                                                                                           
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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[Chandler’s Attorney]: Isn’t that in your plea agreement letter? 
[Yearwood]: Yes, it is. 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: But they haven’t, and it’s [the assistant 
United States Attorney] who is going to write that letter to this 
Judge to say that you're honest and forthright, so you are going 
to talk about Linda Chandler, is that correct? 
[Yearwood]: No. 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: That's what you are here for today, to talk 
about Linda Chandler? 
[Yearwood]: No, I'm here to tell the truth. 
. . . 
 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: And you know that you’re here, you’re 
facing a heavy sentence—what did your attorney, Mr. Riester, 
tell you you’re facing? 
[United States Attorney]: Your honor, again I object to 
discussing the penalties here. 
[The Court]: The objection is sustained. I think the point’s been 
made that she knows by testifying she might get a reduction. 
[Chandler’s Attorney]: Okay. No other questions.73 
(c) The Court’s Ruling 
The Third Circuit ruled that the trial judge should have permitted 
Chandler’s attorney to inquire into Sylvester and Yearwood’s subjective 
understanding of their plea agreements with the government.74 It stated, “a 
reasonable jury could have ‘reached a significantly different impression’ of 
Sylvester’s and Yearwood’s credibility had it been apprised of the 
enormous magnitude of their stake in testifying against Chandler.”75 
The court recognized that the jury heard that Sylvester pled guilty to a 
drug offense and could have received twelve to eighteen months 
imprisonment but only received house arrest and probation.76 The court 
ruled that this information was insufficient to allow the jury to adequately 
weigh Sylvester’s testimony. Instead, the court determined that the jury 
should have been told that Sylvester could have received eight years 
                                                                                                                           
 73. Id. at 218. 
 74. Id. at 222. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
266 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:255 
 
 
imprisonment instead of “the modest sentence he in fact received.”77 Thus, 
it ruled “[t]he limited nature of Sylvester’s acknowledgment that he had 
benefitted from his cooperation made that acknowledgment insufficient for 
a jury to appreciate the strength of his incentive to provide testimony that 
was satisfactory to the prosecution.”78 
Additionaly, the court held that the jury was also entitled to learn about 
the benefits Yearwood hoped to receive.79 Yearwood was facing a penalty 
of nearly twelve years imprisonment.80 Since she testified in hopes of 
receiving a reduced sentence, the court stated that the jury was entitled to 
hear the sentencing reduction she expected to receive.81 If Yearwood 
“anticipated a benefit equal to even a fraction of Sylvester’s proportionate 
penalty reduction, her mere acknowledgment that she hoped that the 
government would move for a lesser sentence did not adequately enable a 
jury to evaluate her motive to cooperate.”82 
IV. DO DEFENSE ATTORNEYS’ DESERVE DEFERENCE? AN ANALYSIS 
A. A Broad Test 
The Supreme Court has held that “cross-examination is the principal 
means by which the believability of a witness and the truthfulness of his 
testimony are tested.”83 Even though trial judges are given significant 
latitude to limit cross-examination, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
defense attorneys should be given broad leeway in examining an 
accomplice’s bias. In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, it recognized the test for 
determining if a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights have been 
violated. The Supreme Court ruled: 
We think that a criminal defendant states a violation of the 
Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from 
engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to 
show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and 
                                                                                                                           
 77. Id. (noting that according to the Sentencing Guidelines, the base offense level for a 
defendant convicted of trafficking between 3.5 and 5 kilograms of cocaine is between 97 and 
121 months imprisonment). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). 
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thereby “to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could 
appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the 
witness.”84 
To prove a violation of the Confrontation Clause, therefore, a defendant 
merely has to show two things: (1) he was attempting to cross-examine an 
accomplice about any potential bias the accomplice has for testifying for 
the government, and (2) this bias would aid the jury in determining how 
much credit it should give to the accomplice’s testimony.85 
The Supreme Court has given substantial deference to defense attorneys 
when they are seeking to expose an accomplice’s bias.  In these cases, the 
Supreme Court ruled the limitations placed on cross-examination violated 
the Confrontation Clause. 
The first illustration of this point was revealed by the Court in Davis v. 
Alaska. On February 16, 1970, over $1,000 dollars and a safe were stolen 
from the Polar Bar.86 Police found the safe about twenty-six miles outside 
of Anchorage, Alaska near the home of Jess Straight and his family.87 
Straight’s stepson, Richard Green, told the police that he saw “two Negro 
men standing alongside a late-model metallic blue Chevrolet sedan near 
where the safe was later discovered.”88 Green identified Davis as one of the 
men standing near the Chevrolet.89 
During Davis’s trial, Green was called as a witness.90 Prior to his 
testifying, the prosecutor sought to prevent the defense attorney from using 
Green’s juvenile record for impeachment purposes.91 Davis’s attorney 
informed the court that he would not use Green’s juvenile record to 
impeach his character.92 Instead, the attorney wanted to show Green aided 
                                                                                                                           
 84. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 
318). 
 85. The Court has placed parameters on this rule. For example, the testimony solicited 
by the defense attorney must to be in accord with Federal Rule of Evidence 403. FED. R. 
EVID. 403. Any attempt to expose an accomplice’s bias must be relevant and not harassing, 
prejudicial or misleading. See id. 
 86. Davis, 415 U.S. at 309. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 310. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 310-11 (noting that at the time of the trial Green was on probation for 
burglarizing two cabins). 
 92. Id. at 311. 
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police “out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to his probation.”93 The 
attorney argued that he would only use the juvenile record to expose 
Green’s potential biases or prejudices for aiding the police.94 
The trial judge agreed with the prosecutor and prevented the defense 
attorney from inquiring into Green’s juvenile probation.95  
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.96 The court refused 
to address the Confrontation Clause issue because it believed Davis’s 
attorney was afforded adequate opportunity to cross-examine Green about 
his potential biases or motivations for testifying for the government.97 Davis 
appealed to the Supreme Court.98 
The Court had to decide whether a defendant’s Confrontation Clause 
rights were violated when the defendant could not cross-examine a 
government witness about possible biases “deriving from the witness’ 
probationary status as a juvenile delinquent when such an impeachment 
would conflict with a State’s asserted interest in preserving the 
confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of delinquency.”99 
The Court noted that one of the most important rights under the 
Confrontation Clause is the right to cross-examination, which served two 
significant purposes.100 First, it provided the defendant an opportunity to 
question a witness’s memory and observations.101 Second, cross-
examination served as an effective tool for impeaching or discrediting 
witnesses.102 The Court wrote, “[w]e have recognized that the exposure of a 
                                                                                                                           
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (noting that the judge’s decision was based on Alaska Rule of Children’s 
Procedure 23 and Alaska Statute § 47.10.080(g)). Rule 23 provides, in pertinent part: “No 
adjudication, order, or disposition of a juvenile case shall be admissible in a court not acting 
in the exercise of juvenile jurisdiction except for use in a presentencing procedure in a 
criminal case where the superior court, in its discretion, determines that such use is 
appropriate.” ALASKA R. OF CHILD. PROC. 23. Under Section 47.10.080(g), “[t]he 
commitment and placement of a child and evidence given in the court are not admissible as 
evidence against the minor in a subsequent case or proceedings in any other court . . . .” 
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) repealed by 1996-59 Alaska Adv. Legis. Serv. 55 
(LexisNexis); see also Davis, 415 U.S. at 311. 
 96. Davis, 415 U.S. at 314-15. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 309. 
 100. Id. at 315-16. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
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witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the 
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”103 
In Davis, the Court believed the defense attorney’s inquiry into Green’s 
potential biases was appropriate. The Court noted that the jury was entitled 
to hear testimony about Green’s probation status, because the government’s 
case was largely based on Green’s testimony.104 Recognizing that Green’s 
credibility was an important issue in the trial, the Court stated, “[t]he claim 
of bias which the defense sought to develop was admissible to afford a 
basis for an inference of undue pressure because of Green’s vulnerable 
status as a probationer, as well as of Green’s possible concern that he might 
be a suspect in the investigation.”105 
Additionally, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, the Court reiterated its 
deference to defense attorneys during cross-examination. In Van Arsdall, 
the state of Delaware alleged that Robert Van to testify.106 On cross-
examination, Van Arsdall’s attorney tried “questioning [Fleetwood] about 
the dismissal of a criminal charge against him—being drunk on a 
highway—after he had agreed to speak with the prosecutor about Epps’ 
murder.”107 The trial court allowed the defense to only question Fleetwood 
about the dismissal outside the jury’s presence.108 In addition, the trial judge 
also ruled that Van Arsdall’s attorney could not cross-examine Fleetwood 
about any specific details of his plea agreement with the government.109 
Van Arsdall was found guilty of first-degree murder.110  
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that “[b]y 
barring any cross-examination of Fleetwood about the dismissal of the 
public drunkenness charge, the ruling kept from the jury facts concerning 
bias that were central to assessing Fleetwood’s reliability.”111 The United 
States Supreme Court vacated Van Arsdall’s sentence and remanded his 
case.112 
                                                                                                                           
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 319-20. 
 105. Id. at 317-18. 
 106. Id. at 675. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. (noting that the judge’s rationale for limiting any cross-examination about the 
plea agreement was based on Delaware Rule of Evidence 403, which is similar to the 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403); D.R.E. 403 (1980); FED R. EVID. 403. 
 110. Van Ardsell, 475 U.S. at 677. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 678. 
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The Court believed that completely precluding Van Arsdall’s attorney 
from questioning Fleetwood about the dismissal of his public drunkenness 
case violated the Confrontation Clause.113 It recognized that the jury’s 
impression of Fleetwood might have been different if it had known about 
the dismissal of his criminal case.114 The Court also noted that a judge’s 
latitude to restrict cross-examination cannot, under any circumstances, 
impede a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.115 Thus, as the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “any exercise of discretion once that 
threshold is reached must be informed by ‘the utmost caution and solicitude 
for the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.’”116 
Both Davis and Van Arsdall establish that the Supreme Court has 
afforded defense attorneys broad discretion when cross-examining an 
accomplice-turned-government-witness about his or her motivations for 
testifying for the government. The Court has stated that cross-examination 
“reveal[s] possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as 
they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.”117 It 
has recognized it is a vital constitutional right that should be protected. 
These cases also show that cross-examination allows a jury to better 
assess or weigh an accomplice’s testimony. The policies underlying cross-
examination support this premise. As the Davis court recognized, cross-
examination serves two important functions.118 First, it exposes an 
accomplice’s bias and motivation for testifying.119 Second, cross-
examination tests a witness’s memory or observations.120 The second 
purpose is significant in situations in which the accomplice’s memory or 
observations are swayed by the promise of a reduced term of imprisonment 
or dismissal of a criminal case. It is also significant in situations where the 
government’s case is substantially based on the testimony of an accomplice. 
Cross-examination “is even more important where the evidence consists of 
the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, 
might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, 
                                                                                                                           
 113. Id. at 679. 
 114. Id. at 680. 
 115. Id. at 679. 
 116. Hoover v. Maryland, 714 F.2d 301, 305 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 117. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). 
 118. Id. at 316. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.”121 An accomplice-turned-government-
witness can fit into any of these categories. 
B. Accomplice Statements in Lilly v. Virginia 
In Lilly, the Supreme Court had to determine whether a defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause rights were violated when a court allowed 
introduction of an accomplice’s entire confession that contained both 
statements against the accomplice’s penal interest and implicated the 
defendant.122 Benjamin Lee Lilly and two accomplices, Mark Lilly and 
Gary Wayne Barker, broke into a home and stole some alcohol, guns, and a 
safe.123 They then kidnapped, shot, and killed Alex DeFilippis.124 Benjamin 
and his accomplices then committed two more robberies.125 Mark admitted 
to committing the burglary, stealing alcohol, and participating in at least 
one of the robberies.126 He also informed police that Benjamin shot 
DeFilippis.127 
During Benjamin’s trial, the government called Mark as a witness.128 
However, instead of testifying, he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.129 The trial judge allowed the Commonwealth to 
introduce Mark’s taped and written statements.130 Benjamin was found 
guilty.131 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction.132  
The United States Supreme Court reversed ruling, “we have over the 
years ‘spoken with one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable 
accomplices’ confessions that incriminate defendants.’”133 Prior court 
precedence supported the Court’s position. In Lee v. Illinois, the Court 
stated, “[W]hen one person accuses another of a crime under circumstances 
in which the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the accusation 
                                                                                                                           
 121. Id. at 317 n.4 (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)). 
 122. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 120 (1999). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 121. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 122. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 131 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986)). 
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is presumptively suspect and must be subjected to the scrutiny of cross-
examination.”134 In Crawford v. United States, the Court ruled that courts 
should be suspicious of an accomplice’s confession that implicated both the 
accomplice and defendant.135 The Crawford court even recognized that 
accomplice confessions “ought . . . not be passed upon by the jury under the 
same rules governing other and apparently credible witnesses.”136 
The sentiments of Lilly have been reflected in decisions from other 
courts.137 These courts have also acknowledged that the testimony of 
accomplice-turned-government-witnesses is inherently unreliable and 
questionable. For example, one court has noted, “‘where . . . an accomplice 
of the defendant . . . may have some other substantial reason to cooperate 
with the government, the defendant should be permitted wide latitude in the 
search for the witness’ bias.’”138 
C. Cross-Examination Should Solely Be Limited To An Accomplice’s 
Subjective Understanding of His Or Her Plea Agreement With The 
Government 
Defense attorneys should only be permitted to question the accomplice 
about his or her subjective understanding of any plea agreement he or she 
entered into with the government. The attorney should not be allowed to 
ask the accomplice about the government’s reasons for entering into the 
plea agreement. If the defense were permitted to do so, the accomplice 
would not know of the government’s motivations, and any answer by the 
accomplice would be mere speculation.  
                                                                                                                           
 134. Id. at 132 (citing Lee, 476 U.S. at 541). The Lilly Court recognized that the 
dissenting justices in Lee “agreed that ‘accomplice confessions ordinarily are untrustworthy 
precisely because they are not unambiguously adverse to the penal interest of the declarant’s 
but instead are likely to be attempts to minimize the declarant's culpability.” Id. (citing Lee, 
476 U.S. at 552-53) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 131 (citing Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909)). 
 136. Id. (citing Crawford, 212 U.S. at 204). 
 137. See, e.g., Hoover v. Maryland, 714 F.2d 301, 305 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that a 
defendant should be permitted wide-latitude to search for a witnesses’ bias when an 
accomplice may have a substantial reason to cooperate with the government); Burr v. 
Sullivan, 618 F.2d 583, 586-87 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing defendant’s right to cross-
examine accomplices to show their inherent bias or self-interest in testifying); United States 
v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938, 945 (5th Cir. 1976) (discussing the importance of granting a 
defendant the right to cross-examine an accomplice who may have a substantial reason to 
cooperate with the government).  
 138. Hoover, 714 F.2d at 305 (quoting United States v. Tracey, 675 F.2d 433, 438 (1st 
Cir. 1982)). 
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In Davis, the Supreme Court twice noted that a witness’s subjective 
motivation for testifying was an appropriate subject of cross-examination. It 
wrote, “‘[a] partiality of mind at some former time may be used as the basis 
of an argument to the same state at the time of testifying; though the 
ultimate object is to establish partiality at the time of testifying.’”139 There 
is partiality of mind when an accomplice-turned-government-witness enters 
a plea agreement to testify against another accomplice. 
The Davis Court also stated, “[w]e have recognized that the exposure of 
a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the 
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”140 The accomplice 
has a motive to testify because the accomplice anticipates his or her 
testimony will result in either a reduced sentence or dismissal of his or her 
criminal case. 
D. Federal Rules of Evidence 
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of 
relevant evidence. It provides “Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”141 Any issue relating to the accomplice’s bias is not 
only relevant, but of great probative value. The federal courts and Supreme 
Court have supported this premise by heavily scrutinizing the introduction 
of an accomplice’s testimony. 
Generally, courts are concerned that the value of the accomplice’s 
subjective reason for entering into a plea agreement is not “outweighed by 
the potential for prejudice by having the jury learn what penalties the 
defendants were facing.”142 A jury’s knowledge of the potential penalty a 
defendant is facing, though, should not outweigh the defendant’s rights 
under the Confrontation Clause.” The government’s “interest in protecting 
the anonymity of juvenile offenders, ha[s] to yield to [the] constitutional 
                                                                                                                           
 139. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317 n.5 (1979) (citing 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 
940, 776 (emphasis in original)). 
 140. Id. at 316-17 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)). 
 141. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 142. United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1153 (1st Cir. 1995). This 
concern typically arises when the defendant and accomplice are charged with violating the 
same laws. 
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right to probe the ‘possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the 
[witness] . . . .’”143 
Rule 611 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides the parameters of 
cross-examination. The Rule provides, “Cross-examination should be 
limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting 
the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, 
permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.”144 Trial 
judges should use their discretion to allow defense attorneys to inquire into 
accomplice’s subjective motives for testifying for the government. Such 
information is directly relevant to the credibility of the accomplice-turned-
government-witness by exposing his or her bias against the defendant. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The courts have unanimously recognized that one cannot trust 
accomplices. Not only is the accomplice usually charged with the same 
offense as the defendant, but the accomplice also shares culpability. When 
an accomplice-turned-government-witness testifies against another 
accomplice, he or she does so with the specific intent to receive a beneficial 
agreement from the government. These agreements usually include less 
severe terms of imprisonment or other penalties than the accomplice could 
face if he or she did not agree to testify for the government. The benefits of 
these agreements should always be presented to the jury. 
If a jury is unaware of the accomplice’s understanding of his or her 
sentencing reduction, that jury’s assessment of the accomplice’s credibility 
may be skewed. As one court wrote, “[i]f the trial court [does] not [prohibit 
the defendant] from cross-examining [the witnesses] with respect to the 
magnitude of the sentence reduction they believed they had earned, or 
would earn, through their testimony, the jury might [receive] a significantly 
different impression of [their] credibility.”145 
 
                                                                                                                           
 143. United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Davis, 415 
U.S. at 316). 
 144. FED. R. EVID. 611 (emphasis added). 
 145. Wilson v. Delaware, 950 A.2d 634, 639 n.9 (Del. 2008) (quoting Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)). 
